The primary mission of the social work profession is to enhance human well-being and help meet the basic human needs of all people, with particular attention to the needs and empowerment of people who are vulnerable, oppressed, and living in poverty.
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about the needy reflect a set of mores and ethos around how Americans believe people should live their lives; that is, What is the right way, and what is the wrong way? Welfare policies are ultimately constructed and driven around these values. As Dobelstein (1999) asks, "Is it right to force people to work rather than receive welfare? Is it right to deny welfare benefits to a mother for a child born out of wedlock" (6) ? Is lack of financial means to support the child the problem, or is sexual promiscuity the problem? Or is it laziness? These are but some of the cultural factors that shape the welfare state. They are confounded by ideology, morality, religion, politics, and ethics. In the United States, the erosion of values around the poor and needy has shifted the beliefs and values of the American people around the responsibility for assisting the poor. In the 1960s, there continued to be some hope that new programs (e.g., training and education) would lead to meaningful, well-paying jobs (Dobelstein 1999; Leighninger 1999; Stoesz and Karger 1990) . But the legacy of conservatism that swept through the country in the 1980s led to an attitude of benign neglect that was ultimately embraced and sealed in the 1996 welfare reform bill. That this draconian measure passed under a seemingly progressive Democratic president, Bill Clinton, is further indication of the erosion of values and of moral obligations to the needy and the poor. Parenthetically, some members of the Clinton administration raised moral objections to the welfare law, and ultimately resigned rather than remain to implement it. 6 In the end, instead of questioning the morality of the "personal responsibility" legislation, most Americans would rather portray welfare recipients as promiscuous, immoral, and unworthy of any type of assistance, cash or otherwise.
In sum, the ethos around welfare in the United States has gradually evanesced to one that can now be characterized by apathy, hopelessness, and even anger. It is in this context that PRWORA gained enough support from both Democratic and Republican lawmakers. But professional social workers, whether they personally share this ethos or not, have an ethical and moral obligation to serve the needs and interests of welfare applicants and clients. Are they doing so since passage of welfare reform? Or does the law itself preclude social workers on the front lines of service delivery from meeting their professional and ethical responsibilities?
The Welfare Reform Law
One of the key provisions of the federal welfare law is welfare-to-work, which mandates each state to require able-bodied recipients to participate in work or work-related activities (e.g., job search) after receiving assistance for twenty-four months, or sooner as defined by state law. 7 New applicants to TANF are generally required to attend an orientation on work requirements and responsibilities under TANF. Applicants and clients are also required to sign a Personal Responsibility Agreement (PRA) in which they specifically agree (1) that TANF is temporary, (2) Like no other public concern, perhaps, Norma M. Riccucci that TANF is a work program, and (3) that it is the client's responsibility to get and keep work. To avoid penalties, states must meet minimum participation rates. As of 2002, the minimum participation rate for all families with dependent children was 50 percent. 8 Those exempt from the work requirements generally include disabled recipients or caregivers and "payees" (e.g., grandparents who receive financial assistance on behalf of dependent grandchildren).
The welfare-to-work provision is one of the most controversial aspects of PRWORA because its goal is very ambiguous. 9 Some argue that the goal of welfare-to-work is genuinely to promote employment and self-sufficiency. Others argue that the goal is to divert people away from welfare regardless of their employment prospects or outcomes. Still others argue that the goal encompasses both diversion and self-sufficiency (see Meyers, Riccucci, and Lurie 2001) . Notwithstanding, a host of new rules and regulations to implement the welfare-to-work provision have been imposed on street-level workers. The intake, or application, process drives the worker-client interaction, or encounter, and also places some constraints, albeit minor, on worker discretion. 10 The front-line worker is required to record client responses on the intake form and ensure that the welfare applicant and clients provide certain information and present various documents for verification (e.g., electric bills, rent receipts). In addition, the worker must obtain the applicant's signature on the Personal Responsibility Agreement (PRA), which, as mentioned above, states that the client agrees that TANF is temporary, that TANF is a mandatory work program, and that it is the client's responsibility to get and keep work.
The intake process and the application form vary across the states, but the one feature common to all sites is that it is cumbersome and time-consuming. Moreover, workers' efforts to ensure that certain requirements are met (e.g., the signing of the PRA) can detract from the client's needs' being addressed or even heard. 11 That is to say, workers sometimes become so preoccupied with filling out the forms that they may not hear, and thus not respond to, the needs of the applicant or client. Wallace Sayre (1948) called this the "triumph of techniques over purpose." For example, as will be discussed in greater detail below, a welfare worker in Bibb County, Georgia, insisted on going through an explanation of rules around the family cap, which places financial penalties on TANF clients for having additional children, even though the applicant's tubes had been tied.
Data
Data for this study were generated from a larger research project conducted for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in conjunction with the Rockefeller Institute of Government in Albany, New York. Data were collected through direct observations of the interactions, or "encounters," between street-level workers and applicants in eleven local, county-level welfare agencies in four states: Georgia, 
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Michigan, New York, and Texas. 12 The four states were purposely selected to maximize variation in policy, administrative structures, and political culture.
These observations, or "encounters," provide data on the actual content and process of intake practices in welfare offices. 13 To collect sufficiently detailed information, the encounters were either tape-recorded (permission was granted for the sites in Texas and Michigan) or transcribed verbatim (New York and Georgia sites). A total of 730 encounters in welfare offices were observed for this study.
Data were also generated through paper-and-pencil surveys administered to all workers who had face-to-face contact or interaction with welfare applicants or clients. The survey asked questions about, for example, the workers' understanding of the primary program goals of welfare as well as their personal opinions about welfare and about clients. Out of 286 surveys administered, 200 were returned, for a 70 percent response rate overall.
What Are Workers on the Front Lines Doing?
The passage of PRWORA was intended in part to change the behaviors or actions of street-level bureaucrats. Specifically, there was an expectation that workers would pursue the new welfare goals, either those expressed formally (employment or welfare-to-work) or informally (diversion or deterrence). Nevertheless, determining eligibility also remains an important goal of welfare. Indeed, the performance standards against which street-level workers continue to be measured are error rates (i.e., payment errors for TANF) and standard of promptness . The standard of promptness, or SOP, refers to the promptness with which applications and redeterminations for aid are processed.
The extent to which workers are focusing on eligibility determination in their interviews or encounters with welfare applicants would serve as an indicator of the degree to which they are consumed by intake procedures. Table 1 provides data on the frequency with which street-level bureaucrats focus on eligibility determination, employment, or diversion. The eligibility-determination index relates to the more traditional job task of welfare workers-timely and accurate processing of welfare claims. The employment index relates to new welfare reform goals requiring and supporting employment. The diversion index relates to efforts to deter welfare use, prevent fraudulent claims, and discourage out-of-wedlock births.
As the data show, eligibility determination was most frequently the focus (50.1%) of intake encounters, followed by employment (33.1%) and then diversion (15.9%). Table 2 presents these data by state and also shows that eligibility-determination issues are addressed most frequently across states. It should be noted that the finding of 33.1 percent for employment may be misleading in that the mere mention of the term "work" or the requirement of job search was coded as "employment" even if there was no coaching or counseling, key behaviors for workers to help clients find jobs. Moreover, stating that "welfare clients must work or find jobs" continues to be part of the overall intake process for determining eligibility for benefits. The point here is that the amount of time focusing on eligibility determination (50.1%) may be greatly underestimated. The Intake Process. The examples in this section represent a small sample of the intake encounters for eligibility determination that take place at welfare offices. the needs of clients. Rather, the examples are illustrative of how strict adherence to the rules can interfere with the ethical treatment of clients or applicants. The first example is an encounter at the Department of Family and Children's Services (DFACS), South West Fulton Office in Atlanta, Georgia. The TANF applicant is in her late twenties or early thirties, has two children, and suffers from the disability of schizophrenia. She has just moved to Atlanta from Connecticut. In all likelihood, she will need some level of assistance for life, but the worker proceeds to have her sign the PRA and grants her a one-time waiver from the work requirement.
In another case, the applicant clearly needs food on an emergency basis and continually brings the interview back to this issue, but the worker spends more time counseling the applicant on family planning. The applicant is eighteen years old, has two children, and is pregnant. She is applying for TANF, Medicaid, and food stamps at the DFACS, Northwest Fulton Office in Atlanta. Because the applicant is under twenty-two and living at home, she is not eligible or cannot qualify for food stamps on her own.
In one encounter, in the DFACS office at Bibb County, Georgia, the worker insisted on going through an explanation of rules around the family cap (which places financial penalties on TANF clients for having additional children) even though the applicant had her tubes tied:
Worker: . . . in regards to family planning and birth control. Applicant: I got my tubes tied. Worker: Well, we still have to tell you about it. When TANF came into place they put something called family cap into place.
The worker proceeded to provide a lengthy explanation of the family cap, and then asked the applicant if she needed a referral to the health clinic.
In one last example here from a Dallas, Texas, office of the Department of Human Services, a client clearly shows her frustration with having to follow the rule-driven intake procedure, especially since her previous application for aid, with accompanying verification forms, cannot be found.
The encounter lasted for an hour and twenty minutes with a decision of "pending" for TANF, Medicaid, and food stamps until the client provided additional information and documentation to the caseworker.
These encounters represent just a few examples of how the management-driven application and intake process have affected worker-client interactions as well as potential outcomes. Under welfare reform, new rules were created, thereby resulting in an enormous amount of additional paperwork. Workers are required to get the applicants to sign various forms and enter into various agreements (e.g., the PRA) that often obscure and eclipse the substantive concerns of the clients (i.e., finding or receiving some form of assistance, including emergency food supplies). The process itself has become exceedingly arduous and convoluted. If the goal of welfare reform is to get people off assistance, then the intake process itself helps to fulfill that goal.
The Buck Stops Here
Street-level workers are certainly challenged by the demand to balance their responsibility to abide by the law (e.g., adhere to predetermined rules, procedures, and laws) and their professional and ethical responsibility to address the needs and
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interests of the clients (see Bowman 1991; Denhardt 1988; Menzel 1995; Rohr 1989 Rohr , 1998 . However, by going "strictly by the book," street-level workers may be engaging in unethical behaviors, and they may not even be aware that they are doing so (Adams and Balfour 2004, 4) . Notwithstanding, the compelling question here is, Who or what is responsible for the ethical treatment of clients? That is to say, if the law reflects a certain degree of immorality, at least as some see it, can the burden of ethical responsibility be properly placed on the street-level bureaucrats? Or did lawmakers, policymakers, and the president ignore their ethical obligations when they enacted the law? Once a law embodying questionable moral and ethical considerations has been enacted, are those responsible for the law's implementation relieved of their obligation to ensure the ethical and moral treatment of the persons targeted by the law? A profound example asks, Can the thousands of ordinary civil servants who implemented Nazi Germany's Final Solution simply claim, "We were just carrying out orders" (Adams and Balfour 2004) ? Many argue that when one seeks to balance an obligation to the state with professional responsibility to the client, the interests of the client must prevail. Burke (1997) , for example, argues that bureaucrats have a responsibility to act in ethical and moral ways, notwithstanding bureaucratic rules and regulations. He points to the importance of treating questions of bureaucratic conduct "largely as a matter of ethics and morality," and goes on to say that "moral duties are different in many ways from political and institutional obligations, [but] they are also mutually dependent" (Burke 1997 (Burke , 1019 ).
14 Similarly, Lipsky writes:
An essential condition for transformation of the welfare state workplace is for workers to recognize the need for alliances with their clients. . . . Instead of hiding behind the defense of bureaucratic constraints, public workers must take responsibility for developing the discretionary aspects of their jobs. . . . We should look hard to identify those circumstances in which workers have been able to modify the people-processing approach in favor of more human relations with clients. (1981 ( , 27) Stivers (1994 looks at the tension between bureaucratic responsiveness (i.e., to the state, the masses, public policy, and law) and bureaucratic responsibility to engage in professional, ethical, and moral behavior (e.g., to clients). Stivers argues that one way to reduce the tension calls for greater listening skills on the part of bureaucrats. She writes that "The experience of listening involves openness, respect for difference, and reflexivity. Developing the capacity to listen well promotes accountability by helping administrators to hear neglected voices and engage in reciprocal communication" (364). Later she states that skillful listening promotes the development of moral sensibilities because it models the reciprocity inherent in ideas of justice. . . . Instead of stripping away the qualities of unique individuals in favor of an ideal of universality, listening expands justice to include the details of the situation and the significant differences among human beings. (366) But, as Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003, 157) find, street-level workers possess the power to decide whether to adhere to the rules or to work on behalf of clients' rights and needs. In their study of the "stories" they collected from some
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Norma M. Riccucci Applicant: Yes, we did. We brought it up here. I got a call into Austin right now.
(continued)
As we speak. I've called and I talked to-I don't know-I guess that's your district office, and they're gonna be getting back to me because we brought all that information up here. 
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Norma M. Riccucci of the clients (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003, 93) . Once having rendered a judgment about the client, the street-level bureaucrat will decide whether to "bend" or hide behind rules, procedures, and laws (also see Bowman 1991; Cooper 1998; Gortner 1991) . As Maynard-Moody and Musheno observe, Moral judgments about citizen-clients infuse all aspects of street-level decisions making. To street-level workers, fairness has little to do with the bureaucratic norm of treating everyone the same or even fairly implementing laws and regulations. To our storytellers, fairness and justice mean responding to citizen-clients based on their perceived worth. More than enforcers of law, street-level workers . . . are producers of values and character that embody mainstream notions of moral worth and productive membership in society. (93-94) In short, if the client is deemed morally worthy by the worker, help is on the way; if not, the rules and regulations will be relied upon (read: hidden behind) to deny benefits or services.
How Do Welfare Workers View Their Clients?
It may be, as Maynard-Moody and Musheno found in their research, that some street-level bureaucrats will make decisions about how to treat clients based on their moral judgments about individual clients. Let us see how welfare workers view their clients and also the goals of welfare. This will shed light on whether street-level workers are making moral judgments about their clients and, ultimately, whether they are deliberately avoiding their ethical responsibilities toward their clients.
As seen in Table 3 , while front-line workers believe that state and agency officials seek to reduce welfare caseloads, they do not see PRWORA as a means for reducing the number of people on welfare or for diverting applicants from coming onto welfare. Nor do they view welfare reform as a way to require and encourage clients to work, to prevent fraudulent behavior among clients, or to reduce out-ofwedlock births. Rather, as street-level bureaucrats see it, the primary goals of welfare reform are to accurately determine eligibility for welfare benefits and services, and to help clients achieve self-sufficiency. If street-level workers were not concerned about the needs of their clients, they would not acknowledge the importance of eligibility determination. Instead, they would view diversion or reducing caseloads as their priorities.
The survey results indicate, then, that the workers themselves believe that the intake process and filling out and collecting forms are a key aspect of welfare reform and of their jobs. However, as was noted earlier, under welfare reform the performance of workers continues to be evaluated against eligibility-determination concerns (e.g., SOP and error rates), and this further encourages workers to focus their energies on eligibility determination. This suggests that to the extent workers are focusing on eligibility determination, they may be acting pragmatically, out of self-interest. On the other hand, one could also argue that workers tacitly believe that they are acting ethically and responsibly by continuing to ensure that client eligibility for welfare benefits is performed accurately and in timely fashion.
Further indication that workers may be acting out of a sense of ethical responsibility toward their clients can be seen in Figures 1 and 2 , which illustrate workers'
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views and opinions about welfare clients. As part of the paper-and-pencil survey, workers were asked to indicate approximately what percentage of their welfare clients would rather be on welfare than work to support their families. As seen in Figure 1 , workers do not predominantly see their clients as preferring to be on welfare. The largest segment of the workers (30.3%) see a small proportion (0-24%) of their clients as preferring to be on welfare rather than work. About 38.9 percent see 25-50 percent of their clients as preferring to be on welfare. If workers viewed clients as undeserving and morally worthless, a higher percentage would see their clients as lazy and not wanting to work. Only 1.9 percent of the workers believe that welfare recipients would rather be on welfare than work and support their families. Figure 2 provides additional evidence that workers may not see their clients as unworthy. The data in Figure 2 present results from the survey question asking workers if they believed that it is easy for welfare recipients in their county to find a job leading to self-sufficiency. As the data show, a relatively high percentage (39%) believe that it is not easy to find a job paying a living wage. Only 8 percent strongly believe that it is easy for welfare recipients to find jobs that could lead to self-sufficiency. Again, if workers believed it was easy for welfare clients to find work, they would be less supportive of people seeking eligibility for welfare benefits. 
Summary and Conclusions
The welfare reform act of 1996 has led to questions regarding the ethical responsibility of street-level bureaucrats to effectively deliver welfare benefits to needy families. Because the law created a host of new and very arduous requirements for processing applications for aid, welfare workers are challenged to meet the needs of the state but also, at the same time, to serve the needs and interests of those seeking welfare benefits. A good deal of normative discourse exhorts street-level bureaucrats to place the
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needs of their clients above those of the state. This literature further argues that even if the morality of a law comes into question, street-level bureaucrats are not relieved of their obligation to ensure the ethical and moral treatment of their clients. The present study sought to empirically examine whether welfare workers are acting ethically and responsibly to meet the needs of their clients. It found, first, that the preponderance of street-level bureaucrats' time focuses on eligibility determination. This suggests that welfare workers are working to address the needs of their clients. They may be doing so in part because their jobs are measured against eligibility-determination criteria (e.g., standard of promptness and error rates). However, through other measures, the study suggests that welfare personnel may also be working to help their needy clients because they view them in morally positive ways. In effect, welfare workers are not hiding behind the law to avoid helping their clients receive welfare benefits.
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Norma M. Riccucci analytic unit across sites and organizations. Thus, the sampling unit was defined as "minutes of time workers spend in face-to-face encounters" with TANF applicants or clients per week. Based on surveys of front-line staff in the sampling frame, the average "encounter time" was computed. Hours were then computed to percentages of the entire weekly "encounter time" at each site. A stratified quota sample for observation (60 hours per site) was then allocated across sites in proportion to the share of the site's total encounter time. After determining the quota of hours to be observed in each unit of the site, individual front-line workers in each unit were randomly selected for observation. These employees were observed for a minimum of three hours and a maximum of six, until the quota of observation hours was reached.
14. Also see Bovens (1996) , who provides a taxonomy of administrative responsibility suggesting that public servants may exhibit responsibilities not only to their superiors, but, conversely, to their conscience, peers, profession, or clients.
